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1. Introduction 
 
A particular feature of the recent subprime crisis was its contemporaneous nature as 
problems arose simultaneously in a number of countries. Although similar patterns were 
also observed in past crises, the empirical literature shows a limited treatment of cross 
country patterns of banking crises.2 We test for cross-country simultaneity of banking 
crises within the OECD using the logit methodology. 
 
2. Background 
 
Early theoretical models of bank failures and banking crises such as Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) assumed bank failures were a form of “sunspot”, arising from random 
shifts in depositor perceptions of the likelihood of a run. However, empirical work soon 
began to show that crises were not random within a national economy, but tended to 
occur during recessions (see for example Gorton (1988)).  
 
There are reasons to expect that a crisis in one country might also link to an increased 
probability of a crisis elsewhere, although this does not necessarily imply causality. 
Indeed, the transmission mechanism for such simultaneous crises could be common 
shocks to each country arising from elsewhere. These might include the development of 
new, unsound, financial instruments adversely affecting banking systems in several 
countries, tighter monetary policy in a dominant third country or a global recessions 
impinging on world trade and hence on solvency of corporate clients.  
 
Channels of causality can also be envisaged. One is that a recession caused by a banking 
crisis in one country generates recessions and banking crises elsewhere. Causality could 
also arise from the behavior of investors associated with asset market exposures, where 
shocks to global asset markets can cause banks not only to reduce their exposure to these 
assets but also to other assets which are seen as having similar characteristics, generating 
solvency problems as prices fall. Or causality could be due to information where 
revelation of liquidity or solvency problems in one country’s banks induces runs against 
other countries’ banks that appear similar. Bank behaviour per se can also be at the root 
of simultaneous crises given international interbank exposures, which can lead to cross 
border systemic liquidity problems if one bank defaults, since counterparties may then be 
unable to service their own obligations. 
 
Despite these points, there is little empirical work assessing whether banking crises in 
OECD countries are systematic at an international level, in other words whether banking 
crises in one country tend to increase the probability of a crisis in other countries. For 
example, most banking crisis prediction models (as surveyed in Davis and Karim (2008)) 
employ purely domestic macroeconomic variables, albeit often capturing cross border 
impacts (e.g. terms of trade, exchange rates). One exception is Santor (2003) who finds 
banking crises are more likely following the occurrence of crises in countries in the same 
income group. 
 
                                                 
2 There is, however, a great deal of work on cross border contagion in asset prices and currency crises, see 
Edwards and Rigobon (2002) 
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Empirical work on investor-driven banking crises is also generally at a national level, 
such as that on abnormal bank stock price behavior alongside “bad news” of banks’ 
performance, and depositors’ behavior in response to bad news (Calomiris and Mason 
2001). One of the few cross border studies focused on banking crises is Jayanti and 
Whyte (1996) who found significant increases in UK and Canadian banks’ CD rates after 
the 1984 Continental Illinois failure.  
 
Models of banking crises such as Freixas et al. (2000) typically focus on banking links 
and suggest a potential domino effect if one bank is unable to meet its counterparty 
obligations, which could be cross border. However, empirical counterparts to such 
research are usually at a country level (e.g. Furfine 2003) although Gersl (2007) uses BIS 
data to study cross border effects. However, using direct interbank exposures of banks or 
sectors ignores other potential causes of cross-border crisis simultaneity.  
 
To advance understanding of banking crisis incidence, we created a variable showing the 
weighted incidence of ongoing crises elsewhere (WYCRISC) using 2005 GDP weights. 
Unlike the studies cited above, this variable is not restricted to one type of cross-border 
transmission. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
 
We utilise the multinomial logit, the workhorse approach to predicting crises (Demirguc 
Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Davis and Karim (2008)). There are alternative approaches 
but these are less tractable when looking at simultaneous crises. The logit estimates the 
probability a banking crisis will occur in a given country with a vector of explanatory 
variables Xit. The banking crisis dependent variable Yit is a zero-one dummy which is one 
at the onset of a banking crisis, and zero elsewhere. Then we have the equation: 
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where β is the vector of unknown coefficients and F(β Xit) is the cumulative logistic 
distribution. The log likelihood function is:  
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Coefficients show the direction of the effect on crisis probability, although its magnitude 
is conditional on values of other explanatory variables at time t.  
 
We start with a general model and utilise traditional variables, namely credit growth 
(DCG), M2/FX reserves (M2RES), fiscal balances (BB), GDP growth (YG), real interest 
rates (RIR) and inflation (INFL), as in Demirguc Kunt and Detragiache (2005) as well as 
banks’ unweighted capital adequacy (LEV), the banks’ broad liquidity/assets ratio (LIQ) 
and the change in real house prices (RHPG) as in Barrell et al (2010). The latter paper 
estimated determinants of banking crises in 14 OECD countries over 1980-2006, and 
found LEV, LIQ and RHPG dominate traditional crisis indicators. Bank concentration 
and structure-of-supervision variables (Beck et al 2006) were not discriminators for 
OECD crises. This analysis forms the basis of our work here. Our initial estimation 
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dataset includes 12 systemic and non systemic crises3 drawn from existing datasets, 
which are derived consistently according to relevant criteria.4 We use narrow liquidity 
(NLIQ) comprising cash, central bank and government-issued assets instead of the 
broader LIQ measure including private sector securities, because the latter were 
unreliable as a source of bank liquidity in 2007-9. 
 
4. Results 
 
We estimated our general model over 1980-2006 and assessed whether the errors are 
normally distributed before introducing a contemporaneous cross country variable. Non-
normality could signal an omitted common factor or crisis driver that could in turn be 
correlated with a contemporaneous variable. We would then have to utilise either the 
Pesaran (2004a) Common Correlated Effects approach or the simultaneous logit 
approach. Both of these would have required country-by country regressions, difficult in 
this case owing to the shortage of crises. 
 
We used Pesaran’s (2004b) test for cross section dependence to investigate cross equation 
correlations (ρij) between errors and test for normality. He shows that the correlation 
coefficients are distributed as a standard normal variate CD where N is the cross section 
dimension and T is the time dimension   
 
CD = (2T/(N(N-1))**(1/2)*(∑i=1,N∑j=i+1, N-1 ρij  )     (3) 
The test statistic for the general equation before the introduction of the contemporaneous 
cross country variable WYCRISC is 1.03, below the critical value for non normality of 
1.96. Hence we can add contemporaneous variables without inducing bias on their 
parameters. 
 
                                                 
3 Our core dataset includes 12 systemic and borderline systemic crises in 14 OECD countries between 1980 
and 2006, and we also look at the group of crises in 2007 and 2008. We take information concerning 
systemic banking crises from the IMF Financial Crisis Episodes database (Laeven and Valencia 2007) 
which covers the period of 1970–2007, while we collect borderline-systemic crises from the World Bank 
database of banking crises (Caprio and Klingebiel 2003) over the period of 1974– 2002. Systemic crisis 
episodes cover Finland (1991), Japan (1991), Norway (1990), Sweden (1991), UK (2007) and the US 
(1988, 2007) while borderline-systemic crises are Canada (1983), Denmark (1987), France (1994), Italy 
(1990) and the UK (1984, 1991,1995). Borio and Drehmann consider there were additional crises in the 
UK, the US, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Belgium in 2008. 
4 The IMF criteria are that in a systemic banking crisis, a country’s corporate and financial sectors 
experience a large number of defaults and financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties 
repaying contracts on time. As a result, non-performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the 
aggregate banking system capital is exhausted. As a cross-check on the timing of each crisis, they examine 
whether the crisis year coincides with deposit runs, the introduction of a deposit freeze or blanket 
guarantee, or extensive liquidity support or bank interventions. Or alternatively they require that it becomes 
apparent that the banking system has a large proportion of nonperforming loans and that most of its capital 
has been exhausted. The selection criteria for the wider range of borderline-systemic crises from the World 
Bank are to include failures of individual banks or groups of banks considered to pose systemic risks and 
necessitating government intervention in the institutions concerned. These crises do not involve the 
complete exhaustion of the banking system’s asset base, but involve large scale erosion of that base. 
Finally, Borio and Drehmann looking at 2008 events use the criterion of countries where the government 
had to inject capital in more than one large bank and or more than one large bank failed. 
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We obtain a final specification by sequential elimination of the least significant variable 
at each stage, with a goal of ensuring 5% significance level of the retained regressors. 
The lag length for all variables, except for WYCRISC, was chosen to capture 
developments in the economy prior to the crisis. WYCRISC is contemporaneous as it is 
designed to capture ongoing crises in other countries.  
 
Table 1 shows the traditional variables are dominated by the regressors LEV, NLIQ and 
the variable for simultaneous crises, WYCRISC. Higher liquidity (NLIQ) and capital 
adequacy (LEV) ratios reduce crisis probabilities. Banking crises in other countries 
increase the chances of a crisis in the domestic economy. We tested for the joint 
elimination of insignificant variables: the F statistic is insignificant with a p-value of 
0.26. 
 
Table 1: Sequential elimination of variables  
NLIQ(-1) -0.174   (-3.81)
-0.138   
(-3.058)
-0.14    
(-3.036)
-0.153   
(-3.289)
-0.138  
(-2.969)
-0.145   
(-2.854)
-0.155   
(-2.796)
-0.156  
(-2.749)
LEV(-1) -0.398   (-3.795)
-0.479   
(-4.034)
-0.419   
(-3.473)
-0.502   
(-3.6)
-0.463  
(-3.247)
-0.473   
(-3.266)
-0.462   
(-3.122)
-0.457  
(-2.986)
WYCRISC 3.62    (3.112)
2.582   
(2.075)
2.831   
(2.223)
2.164   
(1.584)
2.295   
(1.665)
2.161   
(1.52)
2.185    
(1.534)
2.256   
(1.424)
RHPG(-3) - 0.08    (1.774)
0.083   
(1.938)
0.078   
(1.817)
0.078   
(1.849)
0.08    
(1.885)
0.09     
(1.906)
0.088   
(1.809)
DCG(-1) - - -0.092   (-1.797)
-0.09    
(-1.788)
-0.086  
(-1.695)
-0.099   
(-1.612)
-0.101   
(-1.629)
-0.1    
(-1.581)
RIR(-1) - - - 0.094   (1.303)
0.086   
(1.187)
0.093   
(1.248)
0.0815   
(1.029)
0.0689  
(0.477)
M2RES(-1) - - - - -0.0001 (-0.822)
-0.0001  
(-0.86)
-0.0001  
(-0.934)
-0.0001 
(-0.931)
YG(-1) - - - - - 0.065   (0.373)
0.0918   
(0.498)
0.091   
(0.494)
BB(-1) - - - - - - -0.0438  (-0.451)
-0.046  
(-0.463)
INFL(-1) - - - - - - - 0.019   (0.104)  
Note: estimation period 1980-2006; z-stat in parenthesis; NLIQ-  narrow liquidity ratio, LEV- unweighted 
capital adequacy ratio, WYCRISC – GDP-weighted average of crises; YG-real GDP growth, RPHG-real 
house price inflation, BB-budget balance to GDP ratio, DCG-domestic credit growth, M2RES-M2 to 
reserves ratio, RIR-real interest rates,  INFL-inflation. 
 
Table 2 shows that using the sample average cutoff of 3.2%, 75% (9 out of 12) in-sample 
crisis observations are called and 64% of no-crisis observations are captured correctly.5 
Eliminating crises in the largest countries or European countries experiencing systemic 
banking crises, does not affect the results. Equally, extending the estimation period to 
include 2007, when there were crises in the UK and US, leaves the parameters largely 
unchanged. The simultaneity variable becomes less significant, although it still retains a 
5% significance level. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) for their most preferred equation had 61% of in-sample crisis 
observations and 69% of no-crisis observations correct. Hence our work stands up well in comparison. 
 6
Table 2: Robustness analysis – country elimination and changing the estimation 
period 
NLIQ(-1) -0.174    (-3.81)
-0.181     
(-4.194)
-0.163    
(-3.305)
-0.188    
(-3.828)
-0.16     
(-3.595)
-0.173    
(-3.616)
-0.185    
(-3.754)
-0.167    
(-3.574)
-0.167    
(-3.679)
LEV(-1) -0.398    (-3.795)
-0.324     
(-3.502)
-0.429    
(-3.374)
-0.405    
(-3.594)
-0.399    
(-3.842)
-0.406    
(-3.629)
-0.366    
(-3.343)
-0.377    
(-3.376)
-0.382    
(-3.597)
WYCRISC 3.62      (3.112)
2.703      
(2.506)
3.391     
(2.647)
3.998     
(3.3)
3.337     
(2.713)
3.712     
(2.911)
3.355     
(2.757)
3.108     
(2.533)
3.0002    
(2.456)
63.9 59.3
75.0 71.4
Final 
panel
US not 
included
Japan not 
included
US and 
Japan not 
included
UK not 
included
Norway 
not 
included
Finland 
not 
included
Sweden 
not 
included
Final panel 
extended 
one year
% of non-crises 
called correctly
% of crises 
called correctly  
Note: Cut off value for the extended panel is 3.5% as the number of crisis and non-crisis observations 
increases in the extended sample; z-tat in parenthesis 
 
We ran additional robustness tests to check the sensitivity of our results, first towards the 
change in crisis dates6, secondly to crises duration and consequent endogeneity between 
the crisis itself and the explanatory variables in the post-crisis period and finally towards 
exclusion of borderline-systemic crises episodes, as defined in footnote 3. Table 3 
illustrates that our final specification remains robust to all the above changes.  
 
Table 3: Additional robustness analysis – changing crisis dates, removing post crisis 
observations and elimination of borderline-systemic crises 
N LIQ (-1 ) -0 .1 74        
(- 3.8 1)
- 0.16 9       
(- 3.75 5)
- 0.1 7        
( -3 .7 74 )
-0 .16 7       
(-3 .79 7)
- 0.25 7       
(- 3.12 5)
L E V(- 1) -0 .3 98        ( -3 .7 95 )
- 0.37 1       
(- 3.64 3)
-0 .4 11        
( -3 .8 92 )
-0 .38 3       
(-3 .73 8)
- 0.62 2       
(- 3.29 7)
W Y CRIS C 3 .6 2        (3 .11 2)
2.9 25        
( 2.4 79 )
3 .70 8       
(3 .20 1)
3.5 72         
( 3.0 85 )
5.9 38         
( 3.2 59 )
O n ly  system ic 
cr ises 
inc l ud ed
F ina l pa ne l
E lim in atio n of 
p ost cris is  
o bse rvatio ns
US cr is is  at 
19 84
Jap an ese  
cris is  a t 19 92
 
Note: z-stat in parenthesis, estimation period 1980-2006 
 
Our final preferred specification is given by equation (4) with the corresponding z-
statistics: 
 
log ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
p(crisis)-1
p(crisis) = - 0.398 LEV(-1) – 0.174 NLIQ(-1) + 3.62 WYCRISC  (4) 
(-3.80)               (-3.81)       (3.11)  
 
Table 4 shows the increment in the probability of a crisis in one country induced by a 
crisis in another country for 2006. Effects feed through WYCRISC, with a greater effect 
the larger the weight the country takes in the average. The systemically important 
                                                 
6 Alternative crisis dates for the US and Japan are based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
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countries (see “average change”) are the US followed by Japan and Germany, UK and 
France. The potential importance of a crisis event in the US is noticeable, as its average 
induced probability is much greater than its size would suggest7. The remaining large 
countries are less influential. The Scandinavian economies and the Netherlands are quite 
vulnerable to events elsewhere, and the UK is also shown to be particularly vulnerable. 
The table implies small countries have an incentive to induce large countries to improve 
their regulatory framework, and large countries have an incentive to co-operate - although 
the US as a dominant player may require side payments.  
 
Table 4: Induced changes in crisis probabilities in other countries in 2006 
 Columns are for countries with a crisis and rows are for countries affected by spillover 
US UK SP SD NW NL JP IT GE FR FN DK CN BG
BG 5.42 0.40 0.23 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.91 0.33 0.54 0.38 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.00
CN 9.25 0.71 0.42 0.10 0.07 0.19 1.61 0.59 0.95 0.68 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.11
DK 18.39 1.57 0.92 0.22 0.16 0.43 3.52 1.31 2.11 1.51 0.12 0.00 0.88 0.25
FN 3.53 0.26 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.58 0.21 0.34 0.25 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.04
FR 8.35 0.63 0.37 0.09 0.06 0.17 1.44 0.53 0.85 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.35 0.10
GE 4.98 0.37 0.21 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.83 0.30 0.00 0.35 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.06
IT 1.80 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.29 0.00 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02
JP 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
NL 26.86 2.61 1.54 0.37 0.27 0.00 5.75 2.18 3.48 2.51 0.20 0.22 1.47 0.42
NW 15.54 1.28 0.75 0.18 0.00 0.35 2.88 1.07 1.72 1.23 0.10 0.11 0.72 0.20
SD 12.04 0.95 0.56 0.00 0.10 0.26 2.15 0.79 1.28 0.92 0.07 0.08 0.53 0.15
SP 3.59 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.59 0.22 0.35 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.04
UK 13.19 0.00 0.62 0.15 0.11 0.29 2.38 0.88 1.42 1.02 0.08 0.09 0.59 0.17
US 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.11 0.19 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02
Avge 8.79 0.67 0.42 0.09 0.07 0.15 1.66 0.61 0.96 0.67 0.05 0.05 0.39 0.11
Country i
C
ou
nt
ry
 j
Note US; United States, UK: United Kingdom; SP: Spain, SD: Sweden, NW: Norway; NL: Netherlands, 
JP: Japan, IT: Italy, GE: Germany, FR: France, FN: Finland, DK: Denmark, CN: Canada, BG: Belgium 
 
Predictions of banking stress for 2007 are reported in Table 5 and are compared to the 
crisis definition from Borio and Drehmann (2009), i.e. “countries where the government 
had to inject capital in more than one large bank and/ or more than one large bank failed”. 
By end-January 2009 this definition included Belgium, France, Germany, the UK, the US 
and the Netherlands.  
 
We show in Table 5 that 5 out of 6 countries that had a crisis in 2008 were already 
showing stress (with the probability exceeding the sample average) in 2007. Our model 
suggests that there was a noticeable risk of a crisis in six more counties including Spain, 
where developments in 2010 suggest that there may be one under way. 
 
There is a marked nonlinearity in the model which is revealed in Tables 4 and 5, which 
depends both on the size and the number of countries having crises. In particular a crisis 
in the US produces a fourfold increase in the probability of crises in the UK, France, 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.8 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The increment to the 2006 probability is independent of the crisis event in the US in the next year. 
8 Note that Table 4 is derived using 2006 data and Table 5 has projections for 2007, so the comparison is 
not exact. 
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Table 5: Banking stress indicators for 2007 (percentage probability of crisis) 
 
 
 2007 Borio-Drehmann 
Belgium 10.47 X 
Canada 14.53  
Denmark 31.88  
Finland 5.99  
France 18.69 X 
Germany 9.45 X 
Italy 3.12  
Japan 0.34  
Netherlands 47.3 X 
Norway 33.24  
Sweden 20.18  
Spain 9.97  
UK 18.89 X 
US 0.73 X 
Bold figures are predictions above the sample mean 
 
Conclusions 
 
The risk of a financial crisis is increased markedly when other OECD countries have a 
crisis at the same time. Since the probability of such crises is in turn increased by low 
capital adequacy as well as liquidity, the results provide support not only for tighter 
national bank regulation but also for international agreements on harmonization of 
regulation at a suitably stringent level, and in particular for tighter and more effective 
regulation in the US. 
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